


HOLY TRINITY ORTHODOX CHURCH

Parish Newsletter

New Parish Center: 20937 Ashburn Rd., #110, Ashburn, VA September 2018

SEPTEMBER BRINGS THE NEW CHURCH YEAR—BEGIN THE WEEKS OF LUKE



Detail, title page, Luke, *Apraktós* [meaning readings for Sundays] Gospel, XI/ XII century (Athos, Iviron, unnumbered, fol. 100). The Greek reads: «One needs to know that Luke begins to be read from the Sunday after the Elevation [September 14], for just then the equinox is taking place; it is called New Year.» This year the equinox falls on Saturday, September 22. (In Antiquity in the Church of Constantinople, the original fixed date of the Church New Year was September 23, Fall equinox in the Julian calendar and the birthday of the Roman Emperor Caesar Augustus.) **Read about the Church New Year (and how it figured in determining the date of Christmas) in our new Liturgy Book, pgs. 166–168, and pg. 63.**

SEPTEMBER—DAY 12 HOURS, NIGHT 12

16 Sun^{16•VII} SUNDAY AFTER THE ELEVATION OF THE CROSS: **THE NEW CHURCH YEAR**
 10:00 a.m. **Common Confession Rite**—*in conjunction with the time.*
 ~10:45 a.m. Divine Liturgy—**Coffee Hour: Adams**

BECAUSE ALL OF US FALL SHORT IN MANY WAYS, as St. James says in his epistle (3.2), it is appropriate for a parish to bring back the original idea of beginning the church year with penitential prayer, driving home to ourselves, despite any evidence to the contrary, that we are in fact disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ—a people responsible, resourceful, and resilient... and accountable. So plan on taking part in the **Common Confession Rite on the 17th**. Come on time. Come in the right frame of mind. As the Apostle says, “Let us encourage one another” with our presence.

23 Sun^{16•VII•Lk1} 10:00 a.m. Divine Liturgy—**Coffee Hour: Belinsky**
 30 Sun^{17•VIII•Lk2} 10:00 a.m. Divine Liturgy—**Coffee Hour: Busenberg**

OCTOBER—DAY 11 HOURS, NIGHT 13

6 Sat 6:00 p.m. Vepers **returns**
 7 Sun^{18•I•Lk3} 10:00 a.m. Divine Liturgy—**Coffee Hour: Bobrovsky**

SanktHubertus XXV—is in the works!

Maria Hawkins is reminding us that her *SanktHubertus* Roast Venison Dinner for 20 diner-donors will be held as usual on the first Saturday in November—November 3. (There will be no Vespers that evening.)

It is only right to praise you in Sion, O God! Vows to you shall be fulfilled, ²for you listen to prayer. All flesh must lay its faults before you; ³though our faults overpower us, you blot them out....

⁵You answer us with awesome deeds of righteousness, O God, our Saviour. You are the hope of the very ends of the earth, of those far beyond the seas....

¹³Crown the year with your bounty. Wherever you pass, let there be plenty.... And everywhere, let there be joy; everywhere, songs of praise!

—Psalm 64,
Alleluia for the New Church Year

ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH TAKES MOSCOW DOWN A PEG OVER CHURCH RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE—Is something afoot?

Constantinople Does Not Recognize the Transfer of the Canonical Kiev Metropolia to the Moscow Patriarchate [*This is in reference to Peter the Galician, Archbishop of Kiev and Constantinople’s Exarch, who in 1326 A.D. packed his bags and abandoned Kiev to take up residence in Moscow (which was not the seat of a bishop at the time), Kiev having been reduced to a ghost town by the Tatars.—Ed.*]

Constantinople has never recognized Moscow’s church authority over Ukraine, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew said during the 40th Day memorial service for Metropolitan Evangelos of Perga on 1 July. The head of the information department of Ukraine’s Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, Archbishop Evstratij (Zorya), published this message of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s press service on Facebook.

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 Α Π Ο Τ Υ Γ Χ Α Ν Ο

According to talk on the street, something momentous is going to happen in the Church of Rus', and if it does, the OCA will be at sixes and sevens.



“Let us not forget, at any rate, that Constantinople never renounced the territory of Ukraine in any way but the right of ordination of the Metropolitan of Kiev in Moscow on condition of being elected in Kiev at the Clerical Assembly and mentioning the Ecumenical Patriarch. This is said in the Tomos on autocephaly that the Mother Church gave the Polish Church: our See has never recognized the secession of the Kiev Metropolia and its dependent Orthodox Churches of Lithuania and Poland and their attachment to the Moscow Church, which was carried out not in accordance with ordinances and without respecting the rights of the Kiev Metropolitan who had the title of Exarch of the Ecumenical Throne,” Patriarch Bartholomew said.

He said that the Ecumenical See was looking forward to “the restoration of the unity of the divided ecclesiastical body in Ukraine—dozens of millions of believers, baptized and enlightened by the direct care and missionary activities of the Ecumenical Throne.”

“Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew expressed his unwavering interest in the treatment of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical issue and the restoration of the unity of the divided ecclesiastical body in the country. He recalled that the Church of Constantinople, which worked and solved difficult ecclesiastical issues, always in the light of the benefit of the people of God and the preservation of the Pan-Orthodox unity, is still struggling to definitively settle ecclesiastical issues in Ukraine,” the message reads.

[This brief report appeared on July 1, 2018 in *Лівий Беpez (Livyj Bereh, Left Bank)*. Source: *Orthodoxy in Dialogue*, 2 July]

THE PROMISE OF AUTOCEPHALY IN UKRAINE: WHAT'S AT STAKE?

by Nicholas Denysenko

[Deacon Nicholas Denysenko is the Emil and Elfriede Jochum University Chair and Professor of Theology at Valparaiso University. He holds an MDiv from St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary and a PhD from the Catholic University of America. His *The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: A Century of Separation* will be published by Northern Illinois University Press later this year. He is attached to Holy Trinity Cathedral (Orthodox Church in America) in Chicago, IL. (The Denysenko family belongs not to the Old Immigration from more than a century ago, but to the post-WW II resettlement of émigrés.—Ed.)]

Last week, news circulated that Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew is expected to issue a Tomos of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. This news appeared on the heels of a meeting that took place between Patriarch Bartholomew, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and his delegation after Pascha on April 9, 2018. The discussions between the presidential delegation and President Poroshenko were reportedly lengthy, and Poroshenko formally requested the issuing of a Tomos that would be presented publicly on the occasion of the 1030th anniversary of the Baptism of Kievan Rus' in late July. The Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's Parliament, voted to voice its support for the appeal for the Tomos, and the synods of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kievan Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) issued letters voicing their support for the Tomos. The press office of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) claims that the actions of the President and parliament violate Ukrainian law, since offices of the state are interfering in Church affairs, and the UOC-MP is also arguing that all of the Orthodox Churches must agree to autocephaly, and that autocephaly is no longer only a prerogative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The mechanism for granting autocephaly is a canonical issue that was on the agenda of the Holy and Great Council in Crete of 2016, but which was not taken up by the Churches that participated in the Council. Furthermore, there is no clarity on the recipients of the Tomos: to whom will the Ecumenical Patriarch grant the Tomos, where would the inaugural Liturgy celebrating the Tomos be celebrated, which bishops would concelebrate with the Ecumenical Patriarch, and whose names and sees would be entered into the diptychs of global Orthodoxy?

In the remainder of this essay, I will reflect on what is at stake for the major players in Ukraine and for the rest of global Orthodoxy.

The State: The fervor of enmity among Orthodox in Ukraine continued to increase in its intensity. The volume of intrachurch anger and rejection of the other is manifest

in numerous public incidents, the most recent being the refusal of the Zaporizhian eparchy (UOC–MP) to grant a funeral to a child baptized in the UOC–KP who died tragically. These disputes are particularly problematic when parishes decide to change their jurisdictional affiliation, changes in leadership that evoke public accusations, legal actions, and even violence. The ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine and the backdrop of Russian aggression against Ukraine is also deeply troublesome. The state’s position is that Russia uses UOC–MP institutions and people as satellites for promoting its agenda. Legitimizing an Orthodox Church in Ukraine that was liberated from Russian control and influence (emphasis mine) would weaken the capacity of such satellites to divide and conquer the Ukrainian people. Recently, Poroshenko said that one canonical Church in Ukraine would cease the ongoing process of Russian colonization of Ukraine. Removing Muscovite influence from Ukrainian Church affairs has been a staple feature of the movement for autocephaly in Ukraine since 1917. State officials have always understood that religion is the proverbial “glue of the people,” and have acted accordingly throughout Church history. In this vein, the appeals of Poroshenko and parliament fit the historical paradigm.

UOC–KP and UAOC: There have been large, autocephalous Orthodox Churches either in or outside of Ukraine since October 1921, when the first UAOC was born. None of these Churches received official recognition within global Orthodoxy and have carried stigmata of illegitimacy for several reasons, although the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s reception of the Ukrainian Churches in Canada (1990) and the USA (1995) demonstrated that these stigmata were not obstacles to canonical normalization. The UOC–KP and UAOC are the Churches that bear the legacies of the autocephalist movement from its origins. They are both autocephalous, so a Tomos would be count as recognition of their “churchliness” and independence. For these Churches, a Tomos would normalize their relations within the Orthodox world and would also legitimize some of their traditions and priorities: the most important of these is Ukrainization, which includes using Ukrainian as the primary language of liturgy and restoring native Ukrainian liturgical customs that were muted during the synodal era of Church life. The UOC–KP has already offered to relinquish its patriarchal status in exchange for autocephaly: a Tomos could mark the inauguration of a new era of Church ministry in Ukraine. In the new situation, the UOC–KP and UAOC might attempt to claim property currently under the control of the UOC–MP—including the beloved *Pecherska Lavra* [Monastery of the Caves] in Kiev and Pochaev monasteries. The state would have to monitor that situation with great care. One could anticipate this becoming a full-fledged crisis in Ukraine if

plans are not made in advance to mitigate against forceful attempts to seize control of property. Furthermore, the new autocephalous body will have to navigate the reality that many parishes desiring autocephaly will reject Ukrainization. Imposing Ukrainization on parishes that prefer Church Slavonic will alienate people and result in accusations of the Church pursuing a nationalist agenda.

UOC–MP: The state has promised that all people, clergy, and parishes that wish to remain in the MP will have every legal right to do so. In all likelihood, some percentage of clergy and people will join the autocephalous body in Ukraine, so the UOC–MP will become smaller. Some critics have suggested that the UOC–MP change its name to “Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine,” and while such an action might represent the true identity of this body, one can expect that the tactic of inscribing stigmata of illegitimacy on an entire Church would be imposed upon the UOC–MP, an unhappy outcome that would only perpetuate the current crisis in Ukraine. Finally, it would be naïve to believe that autocephaly will remove Russian influence in Ukraine through the Church. It would certainly decrease Russian power, but the shared history of the two countries means that there will always be Russian influence in Ukraine (and Ukrainian influence in Russia), for better or for worse. During the years of the war, the UOC–MP has claimed a martyr identity, referring to public incidents of parish changes in jurisdictional affiliation as evidence of a conspiracy to destroy the Church. Again, without proper care and management of parish registration and property management, the martyr identity will become a slogan of protest announced on the public sphere. The stakes for the MP itself seem obvious, but the greatest adjustment would be to its historical narrative. The Russian Orthodox Church reveres Kiev as the mother of its ecclesial heritage, and the 1917–18 Moscow Council acted to honor Kiev’s prestige by granting the Kievan Metropolia special privileges in self-government (autonomy) and the administration of the Church in Russia. Kiev’s permanent detachment from the Russian Church would decrease the MP’s size and prestige, but would also challenge its narrative that Kiev is the mother of Russian cities.

Ecumenical Patriarchate: Supporters of Ukrainian autocephaly have appealed to the Ecumenical Throne repeatedly for support, beginning in 1918. The EP’s reception of the Canadian and American branches of the Church not only normalized their canonical standing in world Orthodoxy, but positioned the EP as the primary mediator of Ukrainian divisions. The reception of the Ukrainian Church in the USA in particular was vehemently opposed by the MP, but flaring tempers cooled somewhat, and there have been no prohibitions for the Ukrainian bodies of the EP in sharing the fullness of

Church life with their sister Orthodox Churches. Granting a Tomos of autocephaly to Ukraine would land the EP a valuable and large ally in intrachurch politics: they would have good reason to feel confident that the Ukrainians would reward them for the Tomos. But a Tomos also risks a break in Communion with the MP: if the MP was willing to risk Orthodox solidarity to retain power in Estonia, one can only imagine how they will respond to EP patronage of Ukraine. That said, the abstinence of four Churches from the Council in Crete illuminated the existing fissures within Orthodoxy—there may not be enough real solidarity left to keep the EP from risking icy relationships with Moscow for the sake of Ukraine. Supporters of Ukrainian autocephaly will hail the EP as the proverbial Cyrus they have long awaited.

Authors of the Narratives: Ranking no. 3 in the hierarchy of those who have the most at stake are the authors of the Ukrainian narrative. What texts are used to present the history of the Church in Ukraine in seminary and graduate school courses, and who wrote them? There is a vibrant literary corpus of scholarship on the Church in Ukraine that is virtually unknown by Orthodox people, who are woefully ignorant as they tend to read sources authored by non-Ukrainians written with polemical intent. Recognizing an autocephalous Church in Ukraine would legitimize not only the Church, but also free those who study the Church to learn its history from those who are actually living it, and permit Orthodox Ukrainians to assume control over their own public narrative.

Autocephaly and Church Ministry: the desire for autocephaly among some Ukrainians is so strong that it has attained an eschatological quality. Autocephaly does not guarantee excellence in evangelism and Church ministry:

it should be issued in recognition of those marks already present in the Church, but it cannot be the source for an Orthodox Church confronting the twenty-first century. Some commentators have publicly asked, with some doubt, if a true turn in evangelism and theology would result from autocephaly. Or, will autocephaly simply perpetuate pre-modern Orthodoxy in Ukraine, keeping it frozen in the synodal period? An autocephaly that capacitates the formation and production of Church intelligentsia could be a force for much good in global Christianity. Others might wonder if now is a good time to rethink autocephaly as a mechanism for Church governance, since its modern variant seems to honor the notion of one Church for each nation-state. Would multinational regional structures that avoid imperialistic centers prove to be a better model for postmodern autocephaly? The Ukrainian question gives Orthodox theologians something serious to contemplate.

The Ukrainian People: My own research on autocephaly in Ukraine is that most of its people support it because they want to be themselves. The people themselves do not agree on the details: there are many who desire autocephaly, but have no interest in Ukrainization, because Church Slavonic has always been the language of worship in Ukraine. At the fundamental level of identity, autocephaly would honor the fullness of churchliness in those who confess their fidelity to Christ in an autocephalous Church. A Tomos has the capacity to accomplish two objectives: to recognize (not “grant”) the fullness of Christian life of a Church, and to permit Orthodox Ukrainians to be themselves without requiring the approval or living under the supervision of external authorities.

Issuing a Tomos of autocephaly carries some risk, and the Ecumenical Patriarch will have to trust that Ukrainian Church leaders and state officials will act with the utmost




President Petro Poroshenko and Patriarch Bartholomew I (10 March 2016)



Representatives of the UOC MP, including Metropolitan Onufriy, were the only ones remaining sitting while President Poroshenko read aloud the names of soldiers honored as Heroes of Ukraine while fighting against the Russian-separatist forces in Donbas on 8 May 2015. Later, the press service of the UOC MP explained the sit-in as a protest against war as a phenomenon. Photo: lb.ua

prudence and charity. To date, no Tomos has been issued, and maintaining the *status quo* has sadly flamed the fire of enmity among Orthodox in Ukraine, while perpetuating the stigmata of illegitimacy on supporters of Ukrainian autocephaly. Perhaps, then, it is time for the Ecumenical

Patriarch to act by issuing a Tomos, and for the leaders of the Orthodox Churches to offer sure hands of support to all Orthodox faithful in Ukraine, regardless of the temporal city in which their presiding bishop resides.



Why Ukraine needs a free and recognized Orthodox Church

Euromaidan Press Staff May 18, 2018,
Analysis & Opinion

It's hot times for the Church in Ukraine. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine, now subordinate to Moscow, could become independent, aka autocephalous, fulfilling a long-lasting dream going back to the first attempts at Ukrainian independence. President Poroshenko's appeal to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church was supported by the Parliament and delivered to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew on 10 April 2018. A decision is expected in July. [*July has come and gone—Ed.*] Some say that an independent Ukrainian Church is a matter of national security, others—that it is merely a PR move by Poroshenko. Apart from that, there's the Church schism to be considered: for the last 26 years, Orthodoxy in Ukraine has been split in between the unrecognized yet popular Kiev Patriarchate, the Moscow Patriarchate, and the minor Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.


Euromaidan Press sat down with **Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun**, Acting Director of Huffington Ecumenical Institute, Assistant Professor at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, former Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, to talk about the prospects of Ukraine getting its very own Church and what it would mean.

EP: The Ukrainian church structure is rather complex. Why does Ukraine have such a structure? And what structures are we talking about when discussion autocephaly?

Cyril Hovorun: The Ukrainian Church structure is indeed rather unusual. In most Orthodox countries, there is one single church. The idea of one Church for one nation reflects Orthodox Church ecclesiology as it developed in the past, particularly in the Middle Ages, and I would say it is normative in the Orthodox countries. In this sense, Ukraine is not normative; however, this does not mean it is not normal.

Editor's Note: Currently, the Orthodox faithful in Ukraine are divided between three Church formations—the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP, subjugated to the Russian Orthodox Church), Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (UOC KP, formed in 1992), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC, formed in 1921). From the three, only the one under the Moscow Patriarchate is canonical, meaning it's in communion with the rest of Orthodox Churches. The other two are regarded as schismatic by world Orthodoxy.

While traditionally believers identifying with the Moscow Patriarchate outnumbered those of the Kiev Patriarchate, Russia's military aggression against Ukraine tipped the scales. The reason lies in the concept of the



Fr. Cyril Hovorun

“Russian world,” backed by the Russian Orthodox Church, has been widely regarded as an ideology driving the Russian-backed militants in Ukraine as well as reinforcing militaristic, xenophobic views of the Russian populace who give their support to Vladimir Putin, enabling Russian aggression against Ukraine. “Canonical” means “legitimate,” one which is recognized as a church by other Orthodox Churches, which recognize one another and are in communion with one another.

EP: How many Churches are we talking about?

Cyril Hovorun: We are talking about 15 Churches worldwide. Some of them are headed by patriarchs, *i.e.*, patriarchates, some are not but are nevertheless autocephalous churches. In this sense, autocephaly is a normal status for an Orthodox Church. It is the only form in which a church unit exists. It's one of the most ancient and most popular form of church organization.

EP: What does “autocephaly” mean?

Cyril Hovorun: It means that Orthodox Churches don't have a pyramidal structure as the Roman Catholic Church has. The Orthodox Church doesn't have a pope. We are talking about a commonwealth of Orthodox Churches, similar to the British Commonwealth. Autocephalous churches which belong to this family are independent from one another but at the same time, they are in a close relationship with one another, particularly—in eucharistic communion. It means that I, as a member of the Russian Church, can go to the Bulgarian Church and take communion there.

For imperial Russia, it was important to keep the Ukrainian Church under its umbrella to preserve the integ-

rity of Ukraine in the Russian empire. Applied to Ukraine, it means that only one Church is in communion with the rest of the Orthodox Churches, that is the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the so-called Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It means that the members of this Church can go to Cyprus, to Greece, and partake in Eucharist there. The other two churches are not recognized, meaning that their members would not normally be able to take communion in other churches worldwide. Sometimes they do if they are not asked. But if they tell that they belong to the Kiev Patriarchate, the priest would normally not be able to give communion to that person. And that is the consequence of this non-recognized status of the other Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, UOC KP and UAOC. It's not so much whether those Churches are non-canonical *pe se*, as are the implications of this status of the Church for the faithful who belong to those churches. Those members feel as sort of second-class members of the Orthodox community. They are not allowed to take communion in other Churches, they can't be fully received even if they go to pilgrimages for instance to the Holy Land or Mount Athos.

EP: Why did these Churches form in the first place?

Cyril Hovorun: They reemerged in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Ukrainian state. I said "reemerged" in the sense that they did not emerge from scratch. There were precedents in the XX century. The moment when the independent Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian People's Republic was established in 1917, attempts to establish an independent Ukrainian Church were made as well. Again, rather unsuccessfully, because the pressure from Russia was huge, and when Soviet Russia occupied Ukraine, they crushed any attempt to establish an independent Ukrainian state. Since then, it has become a sort of rule for the Russian state to prevent the independence of the Ukrainian church, because this would secure a common political space where Ukraine would be included. For imperial Russia, it was important to keep the Ukrainian Church under its umbrella to preserve the integrity of Ukraine in the Russian empire. With the new independence of Ukraine in 1991, there was an attempt to reestablish an independent Ukrainian Church. The Russian state opposed those attempts as they opposed attempts at the start of the XX century.

So, the non-canonical unrecognized status of two Ukrainian Churches owes itself to a great extent to Russia. We observe how the efforts of the Russian politicians, not only the Church but also the Russian diplomacy and state machinery, have increased to prevent this from happening.

In Ukraine, the institute of Church autocephaly, which is the most ancient form of Church governance, is sometimes interpreted as an instrument of colonization or decolonization, even though this institute appeared and was adopted by the Church before any colonial kind of idea.

EP: You mentioned that Russia prevents Ukraine from establishing an autocephalous Church because it doesn't want the country to create its own political space. However, Ukraine now has a secular state, the Church is separated from the state. How can we talk about a political space?

Cyril Hovorun: Ukraine is certainly not a religious state, according to its Constitution. It's not a theocracy, it doesn't have an established Church in the same sense as some European countries have, like Germany or Finland. The ideology of the "Russian world" is religious as such, it's not a secular ideology. Its religious rhetoric rides on the counterposition of the east and west, of the presumably holy, religious, spiritual East, and godless West. At the same time, the Ukrainian society is ultimately religious, it's more religious than most European countries, its religiosity can be compared to the Polish society. In the political and social discourse, religion plays a very important role in Ukraine. This religious discourse played a very important role during the Euromaidan revolution. Maidan was a political phenomenon, a manifestation of the people who wanted political change. At the same time, the way how the demands of the people were expressed in Ukraine was not secular, it was religious. People articulated political and social concepts through religious symbols and they participated in everyday prayer on the Maidan. A lot of priests and bishops ascended to the scene of the Maidan and addressed people.

So, Maidan was a religious phenomenon in some sense, and this exactly indicated the priorities and ways in which Ukrainian people express themselves. Even if Ukrainians don't go necessarily to church regularly, they still understand themselves in a religious sense, a sort of cultural Christianity. That's why the idea of autocephaly stirred so much controversy and interest in the Ukrainian society. Besides that, the Russian aggression against Ukraine was also expressed, articulated and moved by religiously charged rhetoric. The ideology of the "Russian world" is religious as such, it's not a secular ideology. Its religious rhetoric rides on the counterposition of the east and west, of the presumably holy, religious, spiritual East, and godless West. It renders the conflict in Ukraine in the terms of the counterposition of the Orthodox civilization and the opposite civilization, like the Catholic, Protestant or atheist civilizations. This rhetoric has been constructed by the Church and it means that the aggression against Ukraine has a religious dimension, just as the Maidan had a religious dimension even though it was a political and social phenomenon. They are the opposite side of two very different interpretations of religion. I think the interpretation of the Maidan was non-violent, and interpretation of religion as a constructive force, as one that can help build civil society.

Through the “Russian world,” Russian aggression against Ukraine is another interpretation of religion as a force that rebukes something like democratic and civic social values.

Given that the rhetoric of the Russian world is religiously charged, that the Russian aggression features a very strong religious dimension, many people who come to fight to Ukraine on the Russian side, they are motivated religiously. The status of the Ukrainian autocephaly is no more solely an issue for the churches; it is now a political issue, a security issue if you want. To a great extent, it’s a precondition for the survival of the Ukrainian state and society. Hence the concerns regarding the status of the Ukrainian church, because Moscow has used this status since the collapse of the Russian empire as an instrument to colonize Ukraine. So, the issue of autocephaly for the Ukrainian state is a chance for the decolonization for Ukraine.

EP: But maybe this idea of autocephaly is a PR move by Poroshenko? Poroshenko articulated the concerns of many Ukrainian Orthodox Christians: ecclesial recognition by the world-wide orthodoxy, liberated from Russian neo-imperial rhetoric and activities.

Cyril Hovorun: Certainly, it will contribute to his electoral campaign, and it has already become a part of his campaign. It’s not a coincidence that Poroshenko initiated this step when the campaign began. I should say that initiatives to change the ecclesial situation in Ukraine began after the Maidan. There were initiatives from the Churches to offer a solution to this ecclesial-political issue during the war of Russia against Ukraine. Poroshenko for most of his time as president impeded any solution to this issue. He came up with this initiative only recently. I think his rationale is complex. It may be personal, as he’s a faithful member of the UOC MP. It can be political: he understands that this issue contributes to the war. But it’s also political because it may contribute to his reelection. If it will be successful, it will give him a very strong chance to get reelected for the second time. If he fails, because this initiative is now so grossly associated with his name, his chances to get reelected will decrease dramatically.

Although this initiative is presented as political, what Poroshenko did is just articulate the concerns of many Ukrainian Orthodox Christians: ecclesial recognition by the world-wide Orthodoxy, liberated from Russian neo-imperial rhetoric and activities. He and many people who help him to promote the idea in the Ukrainian political establishment also associate themselves with the UOC MP. And they represent the many Ukrainian Orthodox who disagree with the policies and rhetoric of the Russian Church but don’t have an alternative canonical Church to go to. And this creates a very severe dilemma for their consciousness. On the one hand, they want to go

to a canonical church, to be in communion with the rest of the Orthodox Christians worldwide. The only outlet for this communion is the church of the MP; at the same time, they disagree with the rhetoric, the statements, and sometimes, with the absence of statements which sometimes is more telling. Like on war: while the other Churches are outspoken on war and aggression, the UOC MP has never condemned the war. It has never even named the war by its proper name, as war. This creates obstacles for people who go to that Church. So, this is a major concern for many, including people from the political establishment who go to it. I cannot read thoughts, but I think that Poroshenko himself as a personality and a Christian has problems of this sort. Representatives of the UOC MP, including Metropolitan Onufriy, were the only ones remaining sitting while President Poroshenko read aloud the names of soldiers honored as Heroes of Ukraine while fighting against the Russian separatist forces in Donbas on 8 May 2015. Later, the press service of the UOC MP explained the sit-in as a protest against war as a phenomenon. So, they are giving chance to those people facing these dilemmas to go to a canonical Church and feel relieved that they do not subscribe to the Russian aggression, Russian rhetoric when they go to church, and improve their spiritual life. To be fair, this should be done by the churches: it is the business of the churches to relieve people from political agendas. But unfortunately, the churches themselves don’t contribute that much, particularly UOC–MP. So, the politicians interfered. Maybe it’s not the perfect scenario of solving this problem, but it’s the only possible one at this moment.

EP: How would this autocephaly look like? Who would get it in Ukraine, what would happen afterwards?

Cyril Hovorun: It’s still not 100% clear what it will look like. But I can say for sure that it will not be given to any existing Church, but a new structure will be established from the existing elements. Eparchy [administrative-territorial—Ed.] structures of the existing Churches will be included in this new Church, and autocephaly will be given to this new structure. Probably, most of the communities that will enter this structure belong to the Patriarchate of Kiev. But it is also expected that many communities and even eparchies of the Moscow Patriarchate will join it, as well as the third tiny UAOC. There are also expectations that communities from the Greek Catholic Church will join eventually, because so far in the situation of Russian aggression against Ukraine, many members of the UOC–MP left and joined the Greek Catholic Church, as for them, it was the only recognized legitimate alternative. They may come back to this new established Church.

I think the procedure will ride on the precedent which existed in 1924 when after the collapse of the Russian Empire part of the Russian Church in Poland was granted

autocephaly by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This was done in a unilateral way, without consultations with other Churches, referring to the fact that before the end of the XVII century that Church belonged to the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

EP: Is Church autocephaly for Ukraine a new idea?

Cyril Hovorun: The Church of Kiev was established in the X century as a Metropolia of the Church of Constantinople and it existed as such until the end of the XVII century. So, we can say that the Ukrainian Church, even though at that time it was called the Church of Kiev, for most of its history existed under the umbrella of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

A monument to Prince Volodymyr, who baptized the Kievan Rus in 988 and thus laid the foundations of the Kiev Church, stands on the hills of Kiev.

When the Church of Kiev was established in the X century, it became an integral part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and existed as such for a long time. But after the Tatar-Mongol invasion of the XIII century which devastated central Kievan Rus and divided its heritage between two emerging principalities—Moscovy and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth—a division emerged within the Church of Kiev. One part, as part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, went to the northeastern part of what was then Kievan Rus and became the Church of Moscow. In 1589, it proclaimed unilaterally, without consultations with another Church, its autocephaly, which was illegal and remained illegal for 150 years. **At that time, the Church of Moscow was schismatic and not in communion with other Churches.**

Another part of the Church remained faithful to the Ecumenical Patriarchate till the XVII century, and its center moved to the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian state, and then it was given to be managed by Moscow, remaining an integral part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. At that time, the Moscow Church was already recognized by the rest of the Churches, thanks to the effort of the Russian Tsars.

After the Tatar-Mongol invasion devastated Kiev in 1240, the Kiev Church was split in two. One part laid the foundation of the Church of the emerging Moscow principality, which grew into the UOC MP.

We can see a similar “managing” situation, in Greece, when some eparchies of the Autocephalous Greek Church are given to be managed by the Greek Church, but they still belong to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. And they are obliged to commemorate the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In the Moscow Church, this tradition of commemorating the Patriarchate of Constantinople was abolished very soon after the transaction of the part of the Kiev Church at the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian state. And because of the violations of the conditions of

passing this Metropolia of Kiev to Moscow, the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the XX century claimed its rights back, and that was the rationale of the Tomos for the autocephaly of the Polish Church in 1924. I assume that the same rationale will be invoked in the Tomos granted by the Patriarchate of Constantinople to Ukraine again.

It’s ironic that the Church which was uncanonical for 150 years, which separated from the canonical Church, now accuses its sister in doing the same.

Regarding the Tomos, it’s important to understand that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is not creating something new, but is claiming back its own rights. However, now Constantinople is ready to give autocephaly to this Church, and this is new. In 2008, under President Yushchenko, there was another attempt to establish an autocephalous Church in Ukraine. Then, while Yushchenko aimed for an independent Church, Constantinople had a different vision about this Church, it wanted it back to its jurisdiction. There was a clash between these two models, which was one of the reasons why the initiative failed.

Nowadays, Constantinople seems to have agreed to grant independence to the Ukrainian new Church. But this story did not begin in 2008, it began at the start of the XX century. Then, the Ottoman Empire and Habsburg Empires, which included vast Orthodox populations (although they still constituted minorities in those empires), experienced a national awakening and struggled for independence, sometimes with wars against the imperial centers. At that time, autocephaly became a big issue for those empires, as autocephaly was a vehicle for the national independence of Orthodox nations: the Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and so forth.

In the beginning of the XX century, the same movement continued regarding the Russian Empire. After its collapse, the Orthodox nations felt they were not Russians, they claimed their own national identity, continuing the same anti-imperial trend of the Balkans, and claimed autocephaly for themselves. Some of those claims succeeded, some failed. For instance, the Polish Church succeeded. The Polish state was established at the beginning of the XX century after the collapse of the Russian empire, and the Church managed to get its independence in 1924. Also, the Finnish Church succeeded. It was an intrinsic part of the Russian Church, and they managed not to get complete independence, but they were satisfied with an autonomous status within the Church of Constantinople. Ukraine was also engaged in this national struggle at the beginning of the XX century. But because the Ukrainian state failed, it could not enforce an autocephalous Church. The Ukrainian independence movement was quashed by Soviet Russia and this applied to the Ukrainian Church as well. Until the Ukrainian state reemerged again in 1991, carrying hopes for a Ukrainian Church with it.

EP: What's in Ukrainian Church autocephaly for Russia?

Cyril Hovorun: In the situation of war and Russian aggression, Russian political influence has diminished significantly. There are practically no Russian institutions on Ukrainian soil, at least formally, except one: the Church. And the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine has become closer to Russia than it used to be before the war. After the Orange Revolution of 2004, the UOC–MP tried to distance itself from Moscow, tried to prove it is really a Ukrainian Church which understands the aspirations of Ukrainian society. It became effectively independent under Metropolitan Volodymyr, who passed away in 2014.

The new bishop of the Ukrainian Church, Metropolitan Onufriy, it seems, did not continue this line. People who emerged to the leadership of the Church collaborated with the regime of Yanukovich very closely, and they continued somehow to function in the line of the successors of Yanukovich's Party of Regions, the Opposition Bloc. They affiliated themselves quite obviously with Russian interests. Sometimes they function as representatives of those interests. For Russia, this is important, because given the lack of other outposts of Russian interests on Ukrainian soil, the Ukrainian Church is one of those scarce resources that the Kremlin uses. Unfortunately, the Church does contribute to that. It does not distance itself from the influence of the Kremlin.

EP: Why have the UOC–MP representatives affiliated themselves with the Party of Regions and its successor, the Opposition Bloc?

Cyril Hovorun: I think I can't answer this question. One can assume it has to do with different forms of support of the leadership of the Church by the figures in the Opposition Bloc. What is obvious is the deep involvement of an oligarch and member of the of Opposition Bloc, the MP Vadym Novinsky. He is one of the most influential figures of this political force and is very deeply involved in the matters of the Church. He advocates the interests of the UOC–MP and, I think, influences those interests, which raises concerns about the influence of oligarchy on the Church.

It's a big issue for Ukrainian society, the role of the oligarchy. Most Ukrainians detest the idea that oligarchs should influence politics. Unfortunately, this applies to the Church too, and even on a greater scale. We are now entering a new electoral cycle, elections will happen in one year, and the Party of Regions, which is now the Opposition Bloc, wants revenge, and they will use the Church as a vehicle of this comeback. Unfortunately, the Church yields to these political interests and plays on their side.

The battle for Church autocephaly became the battle for Church diplomacies in a sense. I want to emphasize

again that there is a huge difference between some leaders of the UOC–MP, who seem to play on the side of political figures, and the majority of the faithful of this Church. Some leaders I've mentioned lead the Church to a confrontation with Ukrainian society unnecessarily. This confrontation is not something which the Church would naturally support. I don't see any reason for a clash between Ukrainian society and the Church. However, the Party of Regions, aka Opposition Bloc, in order to get support in the next electoral cycle, needs this confrontation, because it can come back to power only riding on it. In this, it coincides with the interests of the Kremlin, which wants to divide Ukrainian society. Hence, all this rhetoric about the persecution of the Orthodox in Ukraine, which people in Europe hear from the UOC–MP, the Opposition Bloc, and the Kremlin.

These are usually false statements which contribute to the confrontation, as there are no persecutions. The only thing that happens is that all religious groups in Ukraine are being treated equally in front of the law. From the perspective of the UOC MP, which was privileged in Yanukovich's time, this is interpreted as persecutions against the Church.

EP: What do the other Orthodox Churches think about Ukraine's autocephaly?

Cyril Hovorun: It's difficult to predict the statements of the other Churches. The battle for Church autocephaly became the battle for Church diplomacies in a sense. Moscow sends its representatives to different Churches to persuade them not to support this movement towards normalization of the church life in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian state tries to use diplomatic means and to persuade the other Churches to support the Ukrainian cause. Who will win—we will see. Unfortunately, the issue of recognition from other Churches has become politicized. Many political factors are at play here. Pressure upon the Ecumenical Patriarchate from the Turkish government, for instance. Also, governments in other Orthodox countries will play some role, and those governments will be motivated or demotivated economically and politically by the Kremlin. So, unfortunately, politics will play an important role in the process of recognition by other Churches. What is needed, even though the Ecumenical Patriarchate will make its decision unilaterally, it will also pursue the process of recognition of the autocephalous Church by other Churches.

EP: Anything else you would like to add?

Cyril Hovorun: Yes. I believe the issue of autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church, the model which is being considered nowadays is a model of plurality. 10 years ago, the model promoted by president Yushchenko was one single Church which will unite all the Orthodox under its umbrella. This would be easy to manage by the state, obvi-

ously. Nowadays, we are talking about a different model, it's a model of one of several recognized jurisdictions in Ukraine, meaning there will be no monopoly of any Church structure and no monopoly from the state upon any Church. It will contribute to diversity in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and this diversity will be legitimate, canonical. I think it will contribute to the change of mentality regarding religious issues. The idea of one single Church, though it is normal for the Orthodox world, doesn't help to develop thinking. If Orthodox accept the idea that there can be several canonical Churches in one state, they will more easily appreciate the other religious diversity in the country. The Ukrainian society is very religious, it's not secular, and it's religiously diverse. There are many Protestants, Catholics of different sorts, Muslims, Jews. I think Ukrainians learned to appreciate this religious diversity, especially on the Maidan. The autocephaly of the Orthodox Church will contribute to the diversity of this landscape.

EP: So you're saying UOC-MP is not going anywhere?

Cyril Hovorun: No, it will stay, and it's good that it will stay because it will contribute to this diversity.

EP: Let's hope that everything works!

Cyril Hovorun: No, everything will not work. Let's hope that something will work.

Interview by Alya Shandra.

**The OCA was uncanonical
for over half a century.**

**L.A. Times endorsements in June 2018,
by Mansur Mirovalev, 29 May 2018, Kiev, Ukraine**

Almost four years ago, Archbishop Afanasiy faced a firing squad.

Several armed separatists in southeastern Ukraine's Luhansk region blindfolded and beat the full-bearded, stately Orthodox cleric in June 2014, weeks after pro-Moscow leaders declared Luhansk's independence and intention to join Russia. The separatists targeted Afanasy because his spiritual leader, Patriarch Philaret, had broken away from the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1990s and lambasted Russian President Vladimir Putin's policies in Ukraine.

Afanasy heard a shot, but the bullet did not hit him. The separatists removed the blindfold and told him to leave Luhansk. His run-down car soon crashed because they had deliberately damaged its brakes, he said. He hates recalling that day, his personal episode in a Russian-Ukrainian religious war that seems far from over.

"I don't like to rehash the past," he said in an interview. But it is the past—the shared, ancient past of Russia and Ukraine—that fueled the conflict.

More than a thousand years ago, in roughly 988, Prince Vladimir of Kiev, a warlike pagan of Viking origin, arrived in Crimea, the peninsula that would eventually be jointly claimed by Russia and Ukraine. There he converted to Orthodox Christianity and wed a Byzantine princess. That immensely boosted the international prestige of Kievan Rus, a nascent Eastern European power that would morph into the modern states of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus.

It would be another Vladimir—Putin—who would underscore that shared heritage when he annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, hailing its return to the "motherland." The annexation came as pro-Russian separatists covertly supported by the Kremlin fought to split off eastern Ukraine, which borders Russia, from the rest of the country.

During the Tsarist period at least 130 ukazy or decrees were issued forbidding the use of the Ukrainian language. Hence the use of Russian in Eastern Ukraine. Towards the West things weren't much different under the Hapsburgs where Hungarian was forced on the people and the Orthodox Church outlawed.

Eastern Ukraine has long leaned toward Moscow in its politics. Many of its people speak Russian as their primary language. The west of the country, including the capital, Kiev, has looked longingly to central Europe for its cultural and political cues, and is linguistically Ukrainian—a Slavic language that is close to, but distinct from, Russian.

Religiously, though, the majority of Ukrainians have long been faithful to Orthodox Christianity, which is based mostly in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

After the Crimea annexation, Metropolitan Onufri, who heads the Russian Orthodox Church's Ukrainian branch, called the pro-Russian separatists "brothers in faith" and bristled at Kiev's military operation against them.

During a parliament session in May 2015, when Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko was reading aloud the names of Ukrainian servicemen awarded for fighting the separatists, the entire audience stood up—except for Onufri and his coterie.

What's even more irksome to many Ukrainians is that Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, the most revered leader of Orthodox Christianity, recognizes only Onufri's church in Ukraine.

To Poroshenko, who came to power in 2014 after violent

protests ousted his pro-Moscow predecessor, Ukraine's ecclesiastic independence is not just a matter of squabbles of elderly, long-bearded men with archaic names.

In early April, Poroshenko urged Bartholomew to recognize an independent and "unified" Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

"This is a matter of national security in this hybrid war, because the Kremlin sees the Russian Church as one of the main tools of influencing Ukraine," Poroshenko told Ukrainian lawmakers in mid-April.

It was not a far-fetched argument.

Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church and a Putin ally, argues that ethnic Russians anywhere, from Kazakhstan to California, are "ethnic Orthodox Christians" whose rights must be protected by Moscow's spiritual and secular rulers.

Their "Russianness" stems from Prince Vladimir's Kievan Rus—and Ukraine is, therefore, a part of the "Russian world" that broke away temporarily, Putin claims.

"Russians and Ukrainians are one people, after all. We don't see a difference," he proclaimed in 2015 during his first visit to annexed Crimea. "I am sure the situation in Ukraine will be straightened out, and Ukraine will develop positively, will step away from the shameful practices that we see today."

Putin justified Crimea's annexation and pro-Russian separatism elsewhere in Ukraine as steps to "consolidate the Russian world"—because in the breakaway regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, Russian speakers see themselves as a majority oppressed by Kiev. One of the separatist squads was named the Russian Orthodox Army.

The independence of the Ukrainian church would therefore deal a deadly blow to the very concept of the "Russian world."

"It would be severely undermined by Ukrainian [religious independence] as Ukraine is the home and center of Kievan Rus and, therefore, of the Russian world," Taras Kuzio, a Kiev-based political scientist, said in an interview.

Unsurprisingly, Moscow opposes Poroshenko's drive for ecclesiastic independence.

Russia "will hardly support and hardly welcome actions aimed at splitting the church," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists in late April.

"Such plans and ideas only benefit enemies of the church," Metropolitan Hilarion, who heads the Russian church's equivalent of a foreign ministry, said in a statement.

Patriarch Philaret, who repeatedly called Putin a "new Cain," dismissed their words as "signs of despair and powerlessness." In recent statements, he accused Russia of trying to stop Bartholomew from recognizing an independent Ukrainian church—and promised that "no one will force" Moscow-loyal clerics to join his church.

The Russian church defrocked and denounced Philaret in the 1990s, and Russian courts ordered the destruction of the only church in Russia that reports to him.

That church, in the town of Noginsk outside Moscow, remains untouched, according to its former cleric, the Rev. Merkuriy Skorokhod. He said it had been spared out of fear that its destruction could prompt retaliation against some 12,000 parishes of the Russian church scattered throughout Ukraine.

There already were calls to destroy the pro-Moscow churches in Ukraine after a shocking incident.

A 2-year-old boy was accidentally killed in the southern city of Zaporizhzhya last December. His parents requested a funeral service at an Orthodox church attached to a cemetery, but its Moscow-affiliated priests refused because the boy had been baptized in the Ukrainian church.

"They said they have rules," the boy's father, Roman Polishchuk, said in televised remarks. "It wasn't God who wrote these rules."

Unification of Orthodoxy may prove hard in Ukraine, whose religious map is a patchwork that reflects the nation's tumultuous past.

Some 11% of Ukrainians, mostly in western regions that once belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, are part of the Greek-Catholic church that retains Orthodox rites but considers Pope Francis its patriarch. Some 44% are the flock of Philaret's church—twice the percentage of Ukrainians loyal to Moscow's Patriarch Kirill, polls show.

More than half of Ukrainians favor the unification of Ukrainian churches into an independent patriarchy, and only 9.2% think that the Russian Orthodox Church should dominate Ukraine, according to a survey by the Razumkov Center, an independent pollster, conducted in March.

If he's granted independence, Philaret will oversee the world's largest Orthodox church after Russia's—giving him considerable clout among other patriarchs of the world's 250-million-plus Orthodox community.

Ukrainians hope the Holy Synod—a congregation of clerics under Bartholomew—will grant Philaret's church independence by July 28, the 1,030th anniversary of the day when newly converted Prince Vladimir arrived in Kiev and ordered its residents to plunge in the waters of the Dnieper River and be baptized.

LA Times/Mirovalev is a special correspondent.



Announcement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate

September 7, 2018

Within the framework of the preparations for the granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has appointed as its Exarchs in Kiev [Kyiv] His Excellency Archbishop Daniel of Pamphilon from the United States, and His Grace Bishop Ilarion of Edmonton from Canada, both of whom are serving the Ukrainian Orthodox faithful in their respective countries under the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

At the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the 7th of September, 2018, from the Chief Secretariat of the Holy and Sacred Synod, from the website of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, September 8, 2018

The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church expresses its resolute protest against and deep indignation at the communique published on September 7, 2018, by the Chief Secretariat of the Patriarchate of Constantinople Holy Synod announcing the appointment of two hierarchs of this Church — Archbishop Daniel of Pamphilon (USA) and Bishop Hilarion of Edmonton (Canada) as ‘exarchs’ of the Patriarchate of Constantinople for Kiev.

This decision has been adopted without an agreement with Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All-Russia and Metropolitan Onufry of Kiev and All-Ukraine and has constituted a gross violation of the church canons prohibiting bishops of one Local Church to interfere in the internal life and affairs of another Local Church (Second Ecumenical Council Canon 2; Council of Trullo Canon 20; Council of Antioch Canon 13; and Council of Sardica Canons 3, 11 and 12). It entirely contradicts the up-until-now invariable position of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and personally Patriarch Bartholomew, who has repeatedly stated that he recognizes His Beatitude Metropolitan Onufry as the only canonical head of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

The Patriarchate of Constantinople’s decision to admit to examination the issue of granting autocephaly to “the Orthodox faithful of Ukraine” has been made against the will of the episcopate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, who have unanimously spoken for the preservation of her existing status.

To justify its interference in the affairs of another Local Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople has produced false interpretations of historical facts, referring to his alleged exclusive powers, which he actually does not have and has never had.

These actions lead the relations between the Russian Church and the Church of Constantinople to a deadlock and create a real threat to the unity of the whole world Orthodoxy.

The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church states that the full responsibility for these uncanonical actions falls personally on Patriarch Bartholomew and those persons in the Church of Constantinople who support these actions.

The reaction of the Moscow Patriarchate will follow at the earliest possible date.

From the website of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations.

—Source: Orthodoxy in Dialogue

By Serving Kremlin rather than Christ, Moscow Patriarchate Now a Small National Church, St. Petersburg Believer Says.

Ilya Zabezhinsky, an Orthodox commentator from the Northern capital, says that the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate by its promotion of the Kremlin’s agenda of “a Russian world” has failed in its Christian mission to the peoples of the former USSR and been reduced to a small national church of the Russian Federation.

Under Patriarch Kirill and President Vladimir Putin, the writer says, the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has become “the ideological department of the powers that be of the Russian Federation and essentially ceased to be the Russian Orthodox Church. Instead, it is becoming the Church of the Russian Federation.”

Instead of reaching out to the faithful in Russia and in the former Soviet republics, Zabezhinsky says, Kirill and his subordinates have “kissed only one president ... blessed only one army ... prayed for only one Olympic team” and in general shown indifference to all the others.

Moreover, he continues, the Moscow Patriarchate has cursed liberals and the West as sources of evil and threats to Russian values, but what forces of evil are these? “In America, there are six million practicing Orthodox Christians, but among us there are no more than three or four million.”

No one in the Moscow Patriarchate should be surprised that all are running away from it, the Christian churches in the former Soviet space, the Russian believers who put Christ ahead of Putin, and all those who care about the rights and freedoms they should have as citizens of a modern country.

Our church, he says, has spent the last 20 years promoting things that have nothing to do with Christianity and not promoting the things that are at the core of the faith. Its members should not be surprised that others are running away from us, as the Ukrainian Orthodox now are, and that unless we change, others will do the same.

Today, Zabezhinsky says, “we are small little local church with a small flock, something that is not bad in

principle.” Perhaps, he continues, it will lead us to give up our “earthly ambitions and remember Christ.” Our size puts us at a level with the Roman Catholics of Austria. That is something we must accept because it is the result of what we have done.

“We will be the Church of the Russian Federation. The rest do not want us. We ourselves are guilty that they don’t. Let’s leave the rest in peace. Let’s give up our protection from the government. Let’s sell our mitres ... Let’s reduce the taxes on the bishoprics ... Let’s make the texts of divine service more accessible.”

That is a worthy program for “the next candidate for Patriarch” in a church of our size and status, he concludes.

—*A post of Paul Goble, Staunton, September 7*

Making Sense of Autocephaly in the Ukrainian Church

Nicholas Denysenko, September 4, 2018

In the Orthodox world, two pieces of news are currently featured from the recent meeting of the assembly of bishops of the Ecumenical Patriarchate: the implementation of autocephaly for the Church in Ukraine, and a mechanism for widowed priests and those abandoned by their wives to marry a second time without leaving the priesthood. Here, I will explain why the autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church is newsworthy.

Let us begin with a practical definition: autocephaly is a technical term identifying a local Orthodox Church that is completely independent in conducting its affairs, and establishing and implementing the pastoral agenda for its life. Autocephaly is designed to honor the local nature of the Church. Church independence is not synonymous with isolation or sectarianism, but it simply means that one church is neither dependent on nor subservient to another. In this sense, independence invites interdependence, primarily through Eucharistic concelebration, but also when bishops cooperate with another in addressing pastoral issues. The borders of ecclesial autocephaly have evolved over the centuries, in alignment with churches dependent on strong metropolises, the borders of empires, and from the late nineteenth century up until now, with the nation-state. For example, the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian churches are autocephalous, in alignment with the emergence of the nation-state after the collapse of empires.

The church in Ukraine is a difficult case, and even harder to understand because of the informational war that results in confusion. Originally, the local Church of Kyiv (Kiev in Russian) was dependent on the Church of Constantinople. When the city-state of Kyiv fell under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Moscow grew into prominence and eventually became the center of the Russian Empire. The See of Moscow naturally became

influential and the ecclesial epicenter of the Empire, whereas the See of Kyiv constituted a large Orthodox minority amidst a Catholic majority. When the Cossacks of Zaporizhia revolted against Polish oppression in 1648, they eventually entered into a treaty with Moscow in 1654 that was supposed to ensure sustaining the Orthodox faith for adherents of the Church in Kyiv. This treaty ultimately subjugated Ukrainians of Kyiv to Moscow: to be sure, many Ukrainians benefited from this new arrangement, especially when Ukrainians who had been educated in the West ascended to influential positions in both the state and the Church. Ultimately, tensions rose between Ukrainians and Russians, especially when their traditions collided or when Ukrainians expressed a desire for independence. In the Church, these tensions sometimes resulted in changes, such as when Catherine the Great ordered that all liturgical services in Ukraine must be pronounced with the Russian pronunciation of Church Slavonic in 1786, and that instruction in the Russian language was compulsory in the collegia in Ukraine.

The opportunity for the Church of Kyiv to become autocephalous emerged with the fall of the Tsarist regime in 1917, in step with Ukraine’s attempt to establish a sovereign republic. Initially, most Orthodox Ukrainians sought ecclesial autonomy: they wanted ecclesial modernization symbolized by praying the liturgy in vernacular Ukrainian instead of Slavonic, a proposal that the Moscow Council of 1917–18 rejected. The rejection of liturgical Ukrainization inflamed tensions, and Ukrainian clergy in Kyiv began to celebrate services in Ukrainian without permission. When the bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate responded by suspending Ukrainian clergy and then deposing them from holy orders in 1920, a small, but influential Ukrainian cohort took action into its own hands by creating its own church in October 1921. This Church constructed an episcopate from scratch, without the participation of bishops, and thereby forsook apostolic succession. While the 1921 church grew rapidly in Ukraine and was popular among intellectuals, Soviet persecution of the Church put a stop to negotiations between the patriarchal Church and the 1921 cohort and Orthodox religious life as a whole was almost completely shut down.

Despite this shutdown, Orthodox Ukrainians attempted to establish their own Church on two new occasions: in 1942, when the Germans temporarily occupied Ukraine, and again in 1989, when churches besides the Moscow Patriarchate became legalized in the late Soviet period. These two churches pursued their goals through canonical means, with bishops who had been consecrated according to the norms of apostolic succession. Ukraine’s independence in 1991 allowed the pro-autocephaly Churches to grow: the most recent sociological data shows that the Church loyal to Moscow has a majority of bishops, cler-

gy, and monastics, whereas the autocephalous branches hold a majority of adherents. This is a major shift from the demographic ecclesial landscape in Ukraine at the time of the Millennium of the Baptism of Rus' in 988, when all Orthodox in Ukraine belonged nominally to the Moscow Patriarchate. There is much more to this story, and I'd like to direct inquirers to my forthcoming book that explains all of this with greater detail, along with my interview on my book.

For many decades now, the Ecumenical and Moscow Patriarchates have been arguing about primacy within the Orthodox Church, especially on the mechanisms to officially grant autocephaly to a church. When autocephaly is granted, the other Churches in the global Orthodox communion recognize that Church as the authentic, local Church in a defined region. The Ecumenical Patriarchate has long maintained that it retains the sole canonical prerogative to grant autocephaly, which is particularly true of the Kyivan Church, since Constantinople established the Kyivan Church in the first place. But the Moscow Patriarchate has been granting autocephaly to local Churches since the Cold War era began, and is arguing that Constantinople cannot grant autocephaly without the agreement of all of the other churches.

The tussle between Moscow and Constantinople explains, in part, why Ukrainians have taken matters into their own hands by establishing their own autocephalous churches without asking for permission in modern history. In the current case, pro-autocephaly Ukrainians are hoping for Constantinople's intervention, and it seems imminent, given the latter's consistent public declarations stating the process of granting autocephaly is in motion. Constantinople is a convenient ally for Ukraine, an ancient authority within Orthodoxy that can accomplish the Ukrainian goal of liberation from Russian colonization of Ukraine. The arrangement is also convenient for Constantinople: as the original mother Church of Kyiv, they will gain a new and formidable ally in restoring their ministry of primacy within the Orthodox communion, especially in the wake of Moscow's last-minute withdrawal from Constantinople's long-planned Holy and Great Council of Crete in 2016.

The primary problem is one of demonization: opponents of Ukrainian autocephaly have consistently depicted its advocates as unchurched nationalists who want to establish a state church. One-hundred years of official literature witness to a public delegitimization campaign directed against advocates for Ukrainian autocephaly, and this campaign thrives in our era of information illiteracy: it is common for people to read a headline and promote a stereotype one cannot substantiate. For their part, the pro-autocephaly Ukrainian cohort appeals to autocephaly as liberation from Muscovite oppression as a major foundation of the rationale for church independence. Attempts

at unification have, to date, failed.

It seems that one approach to the crisis is to start fresh by establishing a new Church directly via Constantinople's patronage. This Church would exist alongside parishes belonging to an eparchy (diocese) of the Moscow Patriarchate, in conformity with Ukraine's policy of religious equality and to avoid coercing people and clergy who wish to remain in the Russian Church from changing allegiances. But problems are sure to erupt with the establishment of the new Church: there could be disputes over parish property, along with explicit and implicit pressure on communities that wish to remain under Moscow to switch sides. Nevertheless, the situation has only worsened in the twenty-seven years of post-Soviet Ukrainian independence, and it was time for more concrete action – the Ecumenical Patriarchate seems to have answered the call.


Non-Orthodox Christians might wonder how any of this relates to them. It is relevant for several reasons. First, an independent Ukrainian Church will contribute to the prestige of the Ecumenical Patriarchate within the Orthodox Church. Second, the legitimizing of an autocephalous Ukrainian Church places Ukrainians on an equal playing field with their Russian sibling. For those who believe in the redemptive power of decolonization and liberation, the establishment of such a church is akin to a long-delayed and long-awaited act of Christian justice. Third, Christians can keep adherents of the new Ukrainian Church honest by reminding them of the need for respect for and tolerance of the Russians living in their midst. Ukraine is large and diverse, and will have Orthodox faithful who self-identify with the Moscow Patriarchate for the foreseeable future. There is no justification for hostility and acts of aggression against people who wish to remain under Moscow's jurisdiction in a society that values religious pluralism. Such acts contribute to the cyclical process of the demonizing blame game.

Fourth, the imminent establishment of a canonical autocephalous Church in Ukraine portends a major shift in the prevailing historical narrative of the Church of Russia, which identifies Kyiv as its mother. A shift on the role and identity of Kyiv has taken place among historians over the last several decades, from the prevailing narrative of Kyiv as the mother of Russian cities, to the distinctions between the medieval city-states of Rus' and Kyiv's evolving identity in modern and postmodern history. Kyiv will be the main cell of the autocephalous Church in Ukraine, an identity that clashes with Kyiv as the primary cell uniting the Russian World of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Adjustment to the new narrative is bound to be rocky and inconsistent.

I would like to close with a personal appeal to all people of good will. The history of the autocephalous movement in the Ukrainian Church is marked by polemics and a

recurring cycle of the blame game. The most unfortunate outcome of this cycle is that people have been taught to hate one another. Non-Orthodox Christians can certainly be a source of strength by praying for peace and the calming of the passions. They can urge Orthodox Christians in Ukraine to learn how to respect one another and to seek reconciliation. But most important is the character and face of the new autocephalous Church: its face must

be Christ, and not merely an amalgamation of agendas drawing from the identities of contemporary Orthodox Church politics. So, let us pray that the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine will be a Christian Church, that her leaders would preach and practice repentance and the kingdom of God, and that she would lead the people of Ukraine to the Communion of the Holy Spirit through faith and love.



SVOTS resurrects renowned Orthodox voices through digitized recordings.

A new website is preserving and resurrecting hundreds of lectures delivered by illustrious teachers and brilliant theologians of the Orthodox Church in the 20th century. Saint Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary launched the new site this June.

The project is a combined effort by Saint Vladimir's Seminary and the Virginia H. Farah Foundation. The website makes available for the first time in digital format older, analog recordings of renowned professors and guest lecturers from SVOTS past and present, including Fr. Alexander Schmemmann, Fr. John Meyendorff, Fr. Thomas Hopko, Metropolitan Kallistos Ware, Sophie Koulomzin, Jaroslav Pelikan, Veselin Kesich, Fr. Paul Lazor, Fr. John Erickson, Metropolitan Philip Saliba, Fr. John Breck, David Drillock, Fr. John Behr, Serge Verkhovskoy, and many others.


"It is our dream to share with the world the voices of illustrious Orthodox Christian speakers and theologians who shed light on important aspects, historical moments, and even spiritual movements of the Orthodox Christian Church in the 20th century, especially in North America," said Seminary President Archpriest Chad Hatfield, who is also among the dozens of speakers whose recordings are featured on the new website.

Between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, cassettes of many class lectures, seminars, and institutes held on the seminary campus were often accessed by library patrons. However, as audio technology rapidly advanced and the public began to discard their cassette players, use of the library's cassette collection languished, and important voices once heard in the Orthodox Church were silenced.

Funding from the Virginia H. Farah Foundation for this digitization project brought to life and light the voices of these Orthodox Christian luminaries, helping to spread their ever-relevant words "to the ends of the world" [Psalm 19.4]. Moreover, the Foundation's funding for this initial project provided a solid basis for the SVOTS library staff to build future digital collections—another important step in a continuing endeavor to keep pace with advancing technologies.

"We're thrilled to be a part of this project," said Eric Namee, president of the Virginia H. Farah Foundation. "Personally, I was deeply affected by a talk given by Fr. Alexander Schmemmann when I was a young man. It's a privilege to help make Fr. Alexander's voice, and the voices of so many other great teachers, accessible to everyone."

In partnership with the Foundation, SVOTS Web Services Director Alexandru Popovici (*pronounced Popovich*) converted around 500 cassettes held in the seminary's Fr. Georges Florovsky Library to digital format, making their contents accessible and portable not only to a new



SVOTS Web Services Director Alexandru Popovici.

generation but also to a global audience.

"It was a very rewarding but exhausting process," Popovici explained. "I spent more than six months working to digitize the tapes and to build the online platform which hosts the recordings. It was worth it, knowing that those incredible resources will be available for many more people."

Access to the recordings on digi.svots is free but requires registering for a free account.

The Virginia H. Farah Foundation is a 501(c)(3) private foundation dedicated exclusively to the work of the Orthodox Christian Church. The Foundation looks for creative projects and programs that serve as catalysts for progress in the Church and have a lasting impact. Its grant recipients are engaged in all areas of Church life, from humanitarian efforts and missionary labor to education and scholarly work. The Foundation's goal is to facilitate the work of organizations and projects that will help spread the Orthodox Christian message while carrying out the work of the Church in the world.

**The Last Word.
PATRIARCHS OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND MOSCOW TO
MEET THIS MONTH, DISCUSS UKRAINIAN SITUATION**



12 August 2018

The canonical status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada was normalized in 1990, and that of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the United States of America in 1994, when these two bodies were received into the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and, ipso facto, into communion with the worldwide Orthodox Church. Their advocacy for an autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine—which is likewise supported by Orthodoxy in Dialogue—can certainly be presumed to exercise some role as Patriarch Bartholomew formulates his approach to the question.

The Russian Orthodox Church responded to the message of the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding the upcoming meeting of its head, Bartholomew I, with the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow.

The Communications Service of the Department of External Church Relations (DECR) of the Moscow Patriarchate has confirmed the announcement that such a meeting is scheduled for August 31 in Istanbul, Turkey, where the residence of the Ecumenical Patriarch is located, Radio Liberty reports.

In this case, in the message, Patriarch Bartholomew is not referred to as Ecumenical, but his other traditional title, Patriarch of Constantinople. The title “of Constantinople” designates the patriarch as a head of one of almost one and a half dozen mutually recognized, “canonical” local Orthodox Churches, the Church of Constantinople, while the title “Ecumenical”—omitted by Moscow—points to his traditional “first-in-honor” status in the Orthodox world and his special powers, including the provision of autocephaly (self-government) to new local Orthodox Churches.

No details of the forthcoming meeting are given, only an account of previous meetings of the two patriarchs, the last of which took place in January 2016.

In an interview with Interfax-Religion, a Russian news agency, Deputy Speaker of the DECR, Mykola Balashov abstained from reporting on the topic of the meeting and only stated that its “agenda is being developed”.

On the evening of August 5, the bureau of the Secretary General of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate first officially announced this meeting, and its theme was defined as “issues of bilateral interest”. As they paid attention to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Patriarch of Moscow will accept a visit at his request.

On the previous day, on August 4th, a hierarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, Archbishop Yevstratiy (Zoria) of Chernihiv and Kyiv reported—referring to the Greek Orthodox media—that during the meeting of the two Patriarchs in late August, a Ukrainian issue will be discussed. “Obviously, the goal of Patriarch Kirill’s visit to Istanbul is either to convince the Ecumenical Patriarch out of making decisions on the ‘Ukrainian issue,’ or at least to achieve their postponement,” he added.

The above-mentioned Greek publication of August 3rd said that the meeting—in which the Russian side expressed interest—would “focus on the hottest issue of the Ukrainian autocephaly.”

A brief report mentions the complicated relationship between the two Patriarchates because of events in Ukraine and added that the result of the meeting of the Patriarchs is difficult to predict.

On April 19, the Ukrainian Parliament voted for a resolution to appeal to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I on the provision of the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. A few days later, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said that the Ecumenical Patriarchate had initiated the procedures necessary to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Patriarch Bartholomew I and the Ecumenical Patriarchate have recently stated that the transition of the Kyivan Metropolis to the ecclesiastical subordination of the Moscow Patriarchate proceeded in a non-canonical manner at that time, and that the Ecumenical Patriarchate, not Moscow, is the Mother Church for Orthodox Christians in Ukraine.

In July, Patriarch Bartholomew I issued a statement saying that the ultimate goal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church.

The Russian Orthodox Church and its current Ukrainian branch, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in association with the Moscow Patriarchate, are opposed to such a scenario that will result in the loss by Moscow of significant levers of influence on social life in Ukraine.

This report appeared on August 7, 2018 on RISU, the Religious Information Service of Ukraine.

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO LUKE presents the ministry of the Lord Jesus as a journey from Nazareth and Capernaum to **Jerusalem, the Holy City** which is, in the words of *The Jerusalem Bible*, **the predestined stage for the drama of salvation and whence the evangelization of the world must begin**. Reading from the Gospel of Luke every Sunday we follow the Lord on this journey. This gives the Church Year its unique shape and dynamic. Working from this ancient start the sacred liturgist was able to craft a Church Year of continuous reading from the Holy Gospel—**Luke, Mark** (+Hebrews), **John** (+Acts which is part two of Luke), and **Matthew**. This is, in our view, sheer genius. Father Schmemmann had a different take on the Church Year, but only because he relied on older Russian authorities whose resources were not as replete or savvy as the modern historians'. And only in the 1980s did the Church of Russia correct herself in the matter of beginning to read Luke *on time*, i.e., the week after the Elevation of the Cross, as does the Church of Constantinople.



Luke and the Journey to Jerusalem

Lk. 4.14 Jesus returned to Galilee in the power of the Spirit, and news of him spread throughout the whole region. ¹⁵ He taught in their synagogues and was praised by all. ¹⁶ He came to **Nazareth**, where he had grown up, and went according to his custom into the synagogue on the sabbath day. He stood up to read....

Lk. 4.28 When the people in the synagogue heard this, they were all filled with fury. ²⁹ They rose up, drove him out of the town.... **4.31** Jesus then went down to **Capernaum**, a town of Galilee. He taught them on the sabbath, ³² and they were astonished at his teaching because he spoke with authority.

Lk. 9.51 When the days for his being taken up were fulfilled, **he resolutely determined to journey to Jerusalem**, ⁵² and he sent messengers ahead of him. On the way they entered a **Samaritan village** to prepare for his reception there, ⁵³ but they would not welcome him because the destination of his journey was **Jerusalem**.

Lk. 13.22 He passed through towns and villages, teaching as he went and making his way to **Jerusalem**.

Lk. 17.11 As he continued his journey to **Jerusalem**, he traveled through Samaria and Galilee.

Lk. 19.1 He came to **Jericho** and intended to pass through the town....

Lk. 19.28 After he had said this, he proceeded on his journey up to **Jerusalem**.

Lk. 19.36 As he rode along, the people were spreading their cloaks on the road; ³⁷ and now as he was approaching the slope of the **Mount of Olives**, the whole multitude of his disciples began to praise God aloud with joy for all the mighty deeds they had seen.

The Roman Church, feeling the need in the late XX century to reform her lectionary or program for reading from the Gospel at her Sunday Liturgies, turned to the Orthodox Catholic East for inspiration. She devised a three-year cycle. Following Pentecost one year, she reads from Matthew till Advent; another year, from Luke; and another, from John. A number of Protestant groups, who keep traditions of the Latin Church, have embraced this lectionary reform.




FOOD PANTRY MOST NEEDED ITEMS


Canned Fruits & Veggies



Canned Meat




Canned Beans & Soup



Cereal




Whole Grain Pasta & Rice




Peanut Butter




Hygiene Items



Household Items



Paper Products



Cooking Oil



Fresh Fruits & Vegetables



Other

Diapers Fruit Cups
Wipes Granola Bars
Formula Popcorn
Infant Cereal
Nutritional Shakes
and Drinks

PopTop Cans and Microwavable Cups Preferred
Low Sodium • Low Trans Fat • Sugar Free

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